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----provides incentives and controls to users through pricing and 
regulation instruments. (Orski,1990; Meyer,1999; Ferguson, 2000; Ison and 
Rys, 2008) 
----involves the regulations and financing on the supply side. 
    Transport Demand Management (TDM) Policies 
Table 1 The menu of  transport demand management policies 
Financing  Regulation 
 • Vehicle & fuel taxes 
 • Parking charges 
  •  Cordon toll for financing urban road  
  
 
• Land use and transport  strategies  
• On-street parking restrictions 
• Carpool and vanpool programs 
• Alternative working patterns 
• Restrict  number of license plates 
TDM is any policies or set of policies aimed at influencing people's 
travel behavior in such a way that alternative mobility options are 
presented and/or congestion is reduced (Meyer, 1997).  
  They provide positive / negative incentives to users : 
 ☺shift modes —  walk, cycle, take transit or rideshare instead of driving. 
 ☺ make fewer trips — telework, shop online or use the telephone. 
 ☺ drive more efficiently — shop locally, avoid peak periods and congested routes.  
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Scope of Presentation 
• Congestion pricing 
Scope of Presentation 
    Transport Supply Management (TSM) Policies 
----the use of policies, programs and regulations to influence supply decisions on 
quantities and qualities of urban transport infrastructure and services. 
Table 2: The menu of  transport supply  management policies 
Infrastructure  Non-infrastructure good 
• High-occupancy vehicle priority lanes 
• Bicycle and pedestrian facilities/programs 
• Park and Ride (P & R) Facilities 
 
 • Infrastructure access charge 
•  Public Private Partnership (PPP)  
►have a strong incentive to adopt a whole life costing approach to design. 
►have rich experience and knowledge with price setting, price sensitivity, public 
perceptions, marketing, and the role of price differentiation. 
►have a financial incentive to enhance economic efficiency in road use 
    (Small and Verhoef,  2007; Veselá, 2006  ) 
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Strength from incentives 
Weakness from cost-effective 
► may lead to increased costs. 
► may entail larger transaction costs  
• Bus Service contract 
Incentive Mechanism of Congestion Pricing 
-----incentivize to travel less;  
Basic Economic Motivation—Marginal Social Cost Pricing 
Cause of road congestion 
          A driver has little incentive to limit the use of his car because he bears only 
his private costs on congested roads and does not need to bear the external costs, 
such as the cost of extra congestion caused by his entrance. (Richard, et al. 2010) 
          The traveler should pay directly for the costs they impose on other 
users as an incentive to use resources efficiently. 
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Marginal 
private cost  
Marginal social cost 
-----incentivize to change from private 
vehicles to public transit;   
-----incentivize to travel at less congested 
times;   
Congestion toll should be imposed on drivers  
           Congestion pricing can be viewed as a monetary incentive 
toward users’ behavior modification 
•  London congestion pricing  (2003) 
• Social experiment of congestion  pricing, Stockholm (2006) 
• Toll rings in Norwegian cities (1990s) 
• Electronic Road Pricing  in Singapore (1998) 
• PierPASS in Los Angeles 
• Credit-based in Dallas, USA 
• Tolled express lane in Orange  County, USA 
 
 
 
 
Access Control system 
Practice implementation 
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Incentive Mechanism of Congestion Pricing 
     In 2003,  motorists driving in central London on weekdays between 7:00 am and 6:00 pm 
are required to pay £5.  
10-20 SEK per cordon crossing 
 Depending on time of day 
No charge evenings or weekends 
Taxi, buses, green cars exempt 
Max 60 SEK/day 
• Reduced delay due to removal of bottlenecks 
• Reduced overall traffic 3-5 % 
• Increased public transport 6-9 % 
• Reduced noise from above ground traffic 
• Less pollution 
• Improved traffic safety 
Types of contract  
1. Cost-plus contract (C+)  
2. Fix-price contract(FP)  
-- The authority reimburses all costs and pays a specified profit rate.  
-- The authority bears all revenue and cost risks.  
--The authority transfers to the transit operator a fixed payment.  
--It can be further separated into two kind 
Gross cost contract  
Net cost contract  
         Conflicting objectives and asymmetric information are two basic 
reasons why the authority chooses to regulate the private operators by 
means of a fixed-term service contract. (Laffont and Tirole, 1993)  
Cause of service contract 
--The operator bears its revenue and cost risks .  
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         Two main types of contracts can be distinguished in the public 
transport industry: (Amaral, Medda and Quidort ,2009) 
Incentive Comparison of Bus Service Contract   
Incentive Comparison of Bus Service Contract   
Gross cost contract  
Net cost contract  
----The operator has two sources of income: the commercial receipts from 
providing services and a fixed transfer from the local authority. 
----Any change in the passenger volume affects its profit.  
----Total revenues from fares are collected by the authority  
----The operator’s sole source of income is the transfer payment from the 
authority, which is independent on its fare-box revenue.     
----Any change in passenger volume does not affect its profit.  
Research 
Scope 
Congestion 
Pricing 
Bus Service 
Contracts  
Operating 
Subsidy 
  ►  Theory 
  ►   Practice 
► Theory 
► Practice 
   ► Theory 
► Practice 
Net  cost contract Gross cost contract 
Risk 
Burden 
Both product and revenue risks are borne by 
the transit operator 
Production risk is taken by the operator 
while revenue risk is born by the  authority 
Payment The operator only receives a subsidy equal 
to the different between the anticipated total 
operating costs and revenues 
The operator pays an agreed prices for the 
production of a fixed amount of services 
-----It provides a “natural incentive” for allocative efficiency as operators 
attempt to maximize revenues and not only minimize costs. 
Table 3 Comparisons of net cost contract and gross cost contract 
Continuous Time Model  
With effort, the operator reduces cost by a(t) .  
That is                , 
0
( ) (0) ( )
T
c t c a d   
 At time t, the realized cost is  
The cost of this effort is  ( ( ))a t
Total discounted profit flow is  
0
( )
T
te t dt 
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Incentive Comparison of Bus Service Contract   
(Gautier, and Yvrande-Billon, 2008 )  
Duration of contract 
A contract that lasts until time T.  
Realized cost functions 
Productive effort  
ˆ ( )c a t 
Discounted profit function 
Cost-plus contract Fixed-price contract 
•  At each time t, authority pays the 
cost c(t) plus a fixed  amount  of Pc+.  
• At each time t, the authority transfers PFP 
( ) ( ( ))CC t P a t 

  
•  At each time t, the profit is  •  At each time t, the profit is  
( ) ( ) ( ( ))FPFP t P c t a t   
 • The operator ‘s incentive to 
reduce cost can be expressed as :  
 • The operator ‘s incentive to reduce cost 
can be expressed as :  
0
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( ) ( ( ))
T
t FP
a t
e P c t a t dtMax
     
• The optimal effort path  • The optimal effort path  
0
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T
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* ( ) 0FPa t t  
For all t<T,  (1) 
Research 
Scope 
Congestion 
Pricing 
Bus Service 
Contracts  
Operating 
Subsidy 
  ►  Theory 
  ►   Practice 
► Theory 
► Practice 
   ► Theory 
► Practice 
-----Fixed-price contracts give more incentives to reduce costs than 
cost-plus contracts do.  
------Under a fixed-price contract, the operator’s incentive of 
reducing cost decreases with time to expiration.  
Incentive Comparison of Bus Service Contract   
(2)  
(Gagnepain and Ivaldi 2002) 
Net cost contract Gross cost  contract 
•  At time t, operator receives a fixed 
payment PNC and fare revenue 
• At time t, the authority transfers PGC 
•  At each time t, the profit          is  
1 2( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ))GC
GCt P c t a t a t   
The operator has two incentives:  
 • Operator ‘s objective be expressed as :  
1 2
1 2
0
( ), ( )
( ) ( ( ), ( ))
T
t GC
a t a t
e P c t a t a t dtMax
     
• The resulting optimal effort under the net cost contract and the gross cost 
contract can be derived as these two inequalities 
1 1( ) ( )
NC GCa t a t
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Productive incentive   
Commercial incentive 
1( )a t
2( )a t
1
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 2ˆ ( )x f a t
Cost of these effort is :  1 2( ( ), ( ))a t a t
( ) ( )c T px T
•  At each time t, the profit           is  
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Incentive Comparison of Bus Service Contract   
( )GC t
( )px t
•The bidder is the firm with the lowest 
operating deficit. (                       ) 
•The bidder is the firm with the lowest cost 
• Operator ‘s objective be expressed as :  
2 1( ) ( ) 0
NC GCa t a t 
( )NC t
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       A gross cost contract provides more incentive to reduce 
cost than a net cost contract does.  
       The gross cost contract does not provide any incentive to 
increase the patronage . While, the operator regulated by a 
net cost contract has incentive to increase the ridership.   
Incentive Comparison of Bus Service Contract   
        Contract renewal is an important source of incentive for 
operators to keep costs low and improve service levels. 
1 1( ) ( )
NC GCa t a t
2 1( ) ( ) 0
NC GCa t a t 
Net Cost ?  Gross Cost ?  
More incentives 
Less payment  
(Roy and Yvrande-Billon, 2007 ) 
City  Contract Type Incentive Awarding method Duration 
Amsterdam Net-cost  Service quality Competitive tendering 5 
Brussels Net cost  Service quality Direct awarding 5 
Budapest Gross cost Patronage Direct awarding 8 
Dublin Gross cost Patronage  Negotiation 5+5 
London Gross cost Quality  Competitive tendering 5+2 
Frankfurt Gross cost Environmental Competitive tendering 6 
Stockholm Gross cost Service Quality Competitive tendering 6 
Paris Gross cost  Service Quality Competitive tendering 5-10 
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Incentive Comparison of Bus Service Contract   
Table 4 The type of bus service contract across European country  
       The C+ contract is totally replaced by the FP contract in the urban 
transport sector due to its very low incentive powers. 
  Extended GC contracts--although authorities still use GC contracts, these include 
relatively large economic incentives for quality and/or passenger improvements.  
  Extended NC contracts imply that the contract also has incentives for further 
improvements in service quality (Longva et al., 2005 ) . 
    Most contracts are not pure gross cost contracts or net cost contracts 
     Competitive tendering is a popular mechanism for the provision of 
local bus services.  
Incentive-based subsidy scheme for public transit 
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Cause of Incentive-Based subsidy Scheme  
      Compared with the social optimal results, the profit-oriented 
operator intends to provide lower service levels and charge high fares. 
To correct this social undesirable behavior, policy instruments  should 
be designed to give the operators incentives to behave in line with 
social aims. (Van Reeven ,2008; K. Jansson, et al, 2008; Savage and Small ,2010; 
Basso and Jara-Díaz ,2010;  ).  
          Although the pre-described net cost or gross cost contracts can 
tack the production inefficiency problem (or X-efficiency) , they do 
not guarantee for increased market efficiency in social sense. More 
elements should be added into the service contracts.   
 
         The incentive-based subsidy linked to the service levels 
and/or patronage can be used with the intention to solve production 
in-efficiency and market inefficiency.  
(Johansen, Larsen and Norheim, 2001)  
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(1) Demand (Q) is supposed to depend on price (p) and service quality (A). 
The inverse demand function is ( , )p Q A 0 0p Q and p A     
(2) Cost is a function of trips made, as well as of quality, c=c(Q,A) 
Step 1 Preparations 
 (3) To make the operator choose the social desired Q and A, the authority 
introduces a subsidy system , S (Q,A). 
Step 2 Optimization 
Authority ---maximize social welfare Operator---maximize profit 
0
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
Q
W Q A p q A dq c Q A  ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )Q A Q p Q A c Q A S Q A    
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Q Q Q Q
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   
With respect to Qπ* With respect to QW* 
With respect to AW* With respect to Aπ* 0
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   
   
   
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p
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 
0
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W p c
Q dq
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  
  
  
S P
Q
Q Q
 
 
  0
Q
S p p
dq Q
A A A
  
 
  
Step 3 Optimal subsidy system 
Micro-economic Modeling Framework (Else, 1985, Sonesson, 2006).  
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  
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The marginal valuation of 
quality by the marginal user 
The marginal valuation of 
quality by the average user 
  If  the average valuation does not equal the marginal valuation, 
the operator chooses a non-optimal quality for a given quantity. 
------If the average valuation exceeds the marginal valuation , the operator 
should be subsidized for quality improvements.   
      If the marginal valuation equals the average valuation, we 
only need to subsidize operators based on patronage.  
    Discussion of the incentive-based subsidy scheme 
------If marginal valuation exceeds average valuation , the operator should 
be taxed for quality reduction.   
Average valuation Marginal valuation 
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S P
Q
Q Q
 
 
 
        A monopoly should be given a subsidy equal to consumer 
surplus in order to choose the socially optimal level of quantity (Q).  
       With the optimal subsidy, the private operator will choose 
socially optimal values for Q and A, as well as for price. 
       With the right economic incentives given by the optimal 
subsidy, the private operator is expected to be socially efficient. 
0
( )
Q
p
S Q Q dq K
q

  

       The fixed deduction( K ) is an arbitrary constant that must be 
chosen to let the operator keep one proper profit in the optimum.  
To sum up:  
Incentive-based subsidy scheme for public transit 
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  Practical implementation 
Quality Contracts in Norway 
Patronage Funding in New Zealand 
Incentive-based subsidy Net cost contract 
Three mandatory steps 
One alternative steps 
only related to the patronage and not affected by the quality.  ( Hasher, et al, , 2002, 2003, 2004).  
Bus in Hordaland 
 (Larsen, 2001; Carlquist, 2001 )  
Inter-city rail in NSB 
 Fearnley et al. 2004 
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 Step One: 
One ideal case is constructed by maximizing SW under relevant 
capacity and budget constraints with respect to seven design variables:  
•  Fare levels for the 3 periods of demand ; 
•  Vehicle-km produced in basic and additional peak service;  
•  Capacity per vehicle- km in basic and additional peak services 
 Step two: 
The incentive-based subsidy system that linked to:   
----number of vehicle kilometers 
---- number of vehicle hours 
---- number of passengers 
 are calculated to make the operators replicate the optimal solution. 
 Step Three: 
           To avoid the excessive profit arising from marginal 
optimization, a lump-sum fee is recommended to be charged.  
 Step Four (Alternative):  
       One bonus/punish arrangement for punctuality is recommended 
in addition to the above arrangement.  
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          Such bus service contract with incentive-based subsidy scheme not 
only combines authority’s the welfare maximizing objective with 
operator’s commercial goal, but also provides further incentives for cost 
reduction and market efficiency. 
 In summary 
Operator Per vehicle-km Per vehicle hour 
(base service) 
Per vehicle hour 
(Additional service) 
Per peak hour 
passenger 
GAIA  3.5 130 300 0 
VEST 2.5 130 250 0 
BNR 1.5 130 250 10 
HSD 1.5 130 250 9 
Table 5 Suggested subsidy rates in NOK for four local transport operators in Hordaland county 
Source: Carlquist (2001) 
        There are two types of incentives: one is the revenue-based, and 
another is subsidy-based. 
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Conclusions 
     With the wave of deregulation and privatization, any intervention from 
public authorities should be incentive-based rather than command and 
control based. 
    Incentive design in urban financing and regulation transport policies can 
effectively reduces the conﬂict of interests between parties and makes 
agents partially responsible for their decisions. 
    Incentive subsidy and bonuses (or their inverse, penalties) are generally 
especially effective in ensuring good performance in terms of outcomes 
(Hensher and Houghton 2004). 
         For the sake of time, some urban transport policies cannot been 
discussed here, such as Parking pricing policies in the CBD , Cordon Toll 
for financing urban road.  
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